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Introduction
Regarded from a philosophical standpoint, freedom of speech is deduced
as a right of free mental expression with intrinsic value.' On the other
hand, it is an instrument of political expediency and is closely linked with
self-improvement of a community in which democratic and egalitarian
values prevail. Here the test of its substance is sometimes considered to be
the right to differ as to things which touch the heart of the existing order. 2
Nevertheless, freedom of speech is not an unfettered liberty. There are no
absolutes. A name has meaning only when associated with the consid-
erations which gave birth to it.3
The goals sought by men in entering society are not purely individual
freedoms. There are others such as the public welfare and social order. It
is, therefore, natural for a democratic society to forbid as criminal any
attempt to change the going system by force, violence or other illegal
means. As a consequence, the doctrine of paramount necessity is often
invoked as protection where the safety of the nation is involved.4 But the
all-embracing power of self-preservation is not absolute either, 5 and hence,
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1To Mr. Berns, freedom would no longer have intrinsic values, and it is a mere process.
See BERNS; FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST FREEDOM, chs. 2 & 7 (195 1).2West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
3Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (195 1).4Chief Justice Vinson of the Supreme Court of the United States remarked: The right of a
government to maintain its existence is the ultimate value of any society. Id., at 509. Justice
Frankfurter of the same court eulogized: National unity is an interest inferior to none in the
hierarchy of legal value, for if it is paralyzed, no subordinate values can be protected. Id., at
520.5 1d.
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in democratic society, serious injury to the state must be threatened before
individual freedoms including freedom of speech can be curtailed.
The Constitution of Korea expressly provides limitations on freedom of
speech, for the maintenance not only of order, but also of public welfare.6
Freedom of speech under the Constitution, therefore, connotes the two
kinds of interests: an individual interest and a social interest. The basic
problem confronting the makers of the Constitution seems to have been
that of securing a just poise between liberty and order. As a result, the
function of the Supreme Court of Korea, acting as a guarantor of individual
rights and liberties, is to maintain the precarious balance between freedom
and authority. If the Court balances freedom of speech against order or
national security, the scales would be tipped for freedom, but if the Court
balances order or national security against freedom of speech, the scales
would be tipped against freedom. 7 In this sense, the Supreme Court may be
considered a "social engineer." 8
In a practical sense, the question of freedom of speech in Korea is not
merely an academic one. The North Korean government has launched a
demolition policy: steady harassment of Republic of Korea troops along
the Demilitarized Zone; sporadic attempts to slip infiltrators into South
Korea in the hope of assassinating high-ranking governmental officials and
stirring up peasant insurrection. In a sense, the nation has become a theater
of war. Under these circumstances, heterodox ideas inimical to national
security may not be protected. As a consequence, the concept of freedom
of speech has been fraught with external difficulties. This is the atmosphere
in which the Supreme Court is called upon to maintain the delicate balance
between freedom and authority.
We then become concerned with a consideration of the meaning of
freedom of speech, or a discourse on the philosophy of the freedom and the
role of the Supreme Court, for the crucial issues in the constitutional
debate can only be resolved by a proper understanding of the role of the
Court in connection with the freedom.
The purpose of this article is to shed light on freedom of speech in
political matters in connection with national security, not on freedom of
expression in general.
6KOREAN CONST. art. 32, sec. 2.
7See HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA 174 (1963).
81t was not until 1963 that the courts were granted the power of judicial review, and since
then, the Court has never decided a case in which it exercised the power, so far as is known.
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I. Legacy of the Past
A. Introduction
No historical linkage with the past is to be found so far as individual
freedoms and rights in Korea are concerned. As we shall see, the sharp
turn of base in the area of individual freedoms and rights was brought
about in 1948 when the Constitution, based on democratic and egalitarian
values, was enacted. Hence, the Korean linguistic equivalents for such
concepts as freedom, the government by the social compact and rule of
law, are of new coinage. Nevertheless, the ancient ghost of laws and
ordinances as to "sedition" often haunted the people of the country. Ac-
cordingly, studying briefly the legacy of the past in relation to freedom of
speech and national security, cannot prove fruitless.
B. Legacy of Yi Dynasty
Yi (1392- 1910) is the first dynasty to have undertaken a systematic
compilation of law-law which had belonged to the hoary Chinese legal
system. Nevertheless, no sphere of liberty was sanctioned. This derives
from the King's attributes of superiority and the ethical foundation of the
dynasty. 9 The King was the fountainhead of justice and law, and therefore
the King was beyond the pale of criticism. In connection with such a tenor,
was the corollary that there had never been a concept of a higher law such
as reason or human dignity in the Western sense. 10 Admittedly, the goal of
the state had been achieved at total surrender of human rights.
But the kingship dwindled through self-restraints and reactions. What
happened in 1895 is one of the moving, triumphant pages of Korea's
history. The King was forced to proclaim the "14-Article Hong Born" (the
Greater Charter) which declared, among other things, the security of per-
sonal liberty and property rights, although it contained no reference to
9 Confucianism was adopted by the Yi Dynasty as the national teaching. The core of it is
"piety" which underlies the highly personalized concept of social relationship. The relation
between men and their government under the dynasty, therefore, had to be filled primarily by
the father-son image. This bred paternalism in government, which was reflected in Korea by
the absolute monarchy.
10"..... All the acts of an individual were regulated, in old times, by these social relation-
ships. Each term of the relationships, according to Confucianism, is a ming or name which
represents a moral principle. Every individual must have some name in terms of the relation-
ships, and it is his duty to behave according to the moral principle represented by that name.
For instance, if an individual is a son in relation to his father, he must behave according to the
moral principle represented by the name son; in other words, he must behave according to
what a son ought to do." Fung, The Philosophy at the Basis of Traditional Chinese Society, in
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER at 26 (Northrop ed. 19). This is why
Chinese law has been a law of duties, but not of rights.
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freedom of speech or of the press." Thus, the kingship began to emerge as
a juristic abortion-corporation sole, by subjecting itself to law. In 1899,
an assembly of men who had a reverence for liberty put a bridle upon the
King by forcing him to reform the administration. As a consequence, the
King had to subscribe to its reform, and at the same time he introduced
other items. One of them was "freedom of expression within the limits of
law (ordinances).' 12 Accordingly, it is deemed a reasonable inference that
freedom of speech, from the beginning, took the shape of an ordered
liberty.
However, running counter to this democratic tenor, a constitution' 3
eulogizing the boundless royal prerogative was proclaimed in 1899.14 This
constitution came into being under the impact of the Meiji Constitution, the
first Japanese constitution which was modelled after the Prussian Con-
stitution. 15 Keeping step with such circumstances, the Press and News-
paper Law was enacted for legal control of expression with licensing and
censorship. The law was the first Pandora's box in the field of expression
in Korea's history. Moreover, the Security Law was enacted for the pres-
ervation of the basic structure of organized society. 16
In 1910 came the demise of the Helmit Kingdom, followed by Japanese
rule which lasted until 1945.
C. The Colonial Rule (1910-1945)
With the beginning of the Japanese rule, a sudden change of the base of
the Helmit Kingdom's legal system was made and, in return, the civil law
was introduced. Most of the Japanese laws which had been in effect were
to be applied to the Korean people, but all provisions regarding the rights
and duties of citizens under the Meiji Constitution were interpreted not to
be applied to them. 17 Moreover, notwithstanding the abrogation of all the
laws enacted under the Yi dynasty, the Press and Newspaper Law and
Security Law were left intact for elaborately controlling discussions. 18
1 C. YU, INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 10 (1953).
121d. at 13.
'
3 Its real name is the State System of Korea.
14C. Yu, supra, note I I at 14.
5 1d., at 15.
16Such laws were enacted under the impact of Japan. Japan, in fact, exercised strong
influence on Korea at that time. For further discussion, see, C. KIM and H. KIM, KOREA AND
POLITICS OF IMPERIALISM 1876- 1910 at 181- 188 (1967).
17"In any event, there was unquestionably discrimination against Koreans in many
fields," Lyman, Notes on Japanese Law: The Administration of Justice in Korea, 35 A.B.A.J.
303 (1949).18K. PARK, GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL HISTORY at 381 (1962).
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Furthermore, the Peace Preservation Law, the Protection and Surveillance
Law for Thought Offence and other anti-subversive laws placed excessive
restrictions on words and publications. Any discussion of public questions,
or advocacy of political doctrine inimical to the Colonial rule, was to be
suppressed or at least controlled. 19
The Japanese legal system as practiced in Korea made a mockery of the
idea of the sanctity of laws, 20 and the Korean populace's hope of rights and
liberties grew faint, for the laws placed only duties and responsibilities on
them.
D. The U.S. Military Government (1945-1948) and
Freedom of Speech
With the termination of World War I1, the United States Military Gov-
ernment was inaugurated in Korea (South) on September 10, 1945. The
Government went ahead with the arranging of pre-existing laws. Thus,
Military Government Ordinance II was proclaimed to wipe out restric-
tions on political, civil and religious liberties which ran counter to the
moral climate of the age and the evolving ethos of democratic society.
Article I of the Ordinance abrogated the Peace Preservation Law, the
Protection and Surveillance Law for Thought Offence, the Press and
Newspaper Law, etc. Article 2 went on to abolish all laws or ordinances
not based on democratic and egalitarian values.2 1
Meanwhile, the Soviet r6gime intensified its policies of communizing
northern Korea. In an attempt to encourage democratization, the U. S.
Military Government likewise took up a campaign against the Commu-
nists. The first step in this direction was enactment of Military Govern-
ment Ordinance 88, which established the licensing of the press to protect
the state against Communist subversive activities. The Ordinance had
brought about many legal questions until it expired in 1960.22
19Under the Colonial rule, "the legal system in Korea was but an additional arm of the
Japanese colonial control." W. SOHN, THE EROSION OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY 32 (1961).20 1d.
21 K. PARK, supra, note 18 at 381-382.22The effect of the ordinance was maintained by the 1948 Constitution, which provided
for a transitory provision recognizing the effect of pre-constitutional laws and ordinances not
in conflict with the Constitution (art. 100).
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 3
Freedom of Political Speech vs. National Security in Korea
II. The Making of the Constitution and
Freedom of Speech
A. The Adoption of the Constitution and
Freedom of Speech
On May 10, 1948, a free and democratic election was held in the area of
the 38th Parallel in Korea.23 One hundred and ninety eight chosen repre-
sentatives came to Seoul and convened as the Constituent Assembly. The
Assembly began to make plans for a sovereign democratic republic, and, as
the first step for this, it set its hand to the making of a Constitution. After
debating pro and con on the draft constitution2 4 worked out by the Com-
mittee on Drafting, but without commendable debates on liberty, the As-
sembly adopted the Constitution on July 12, 1948,.25 It was proclaimed and
went into effect on July 17 of the same year. By it, the Korean people
thereupon started living "in accordance with law" and by "due process of
law" under the Constitution, for the first time in Korea's 4000 years of
recorded history.
In the Preamble to the Constitution, liberty, equality, justice and frater-
nity were enshrined as the cherished ideals. And a comprehensive declara-
tion of libertarian freedoms and social rights was incorporated into .the
Constitution. As a consequence, freedom of speech and of the press was
elevated to a constitutional right. The Constitution read:
Citizens shall not, except as specified by law, be subjected to any restric-
tion on freedom of speech, press, assembly and association 6 ,
Further the Constitution guaranteed freedom of conscience 2 7 which is
inherently prerequisite to free opinion and belief. As a necessary corollary
to freedom of speech, the Constitution provided for academic freedom. 2 8
Thus, freedom of speech acquired an intrinsic value.
It is necessary to discuss the postulates which limit and control the
words of the Bill of Rights including freedom of speech. The historical
23The election was held under the auspices of the United Nations. Soviet Russia refused
to permit participation in the election of the people of the north. For further discussion, see
GOODRICH, KOREA-SURVEY OF U.S. POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS chs. 1-3 (1956).24The draft constitution was based on the draft constitution of Chin-O Yu, the oracle of
constitutional law at that time, and key member of ten specialists who were commissioned by
the Committee on Drafting to collaborate in it. The draft constitution of Seung-Yol Kwon,
one of the ten specialists, was also presented for reference. C. Yu, supra, note I I at 26; T.
HAN, THE NEW CONSTITUTION 19 (1960).
25During their debates, the primary issue was a contest for a governmental system, not
for liberty. C. Yu, Id. at 27- 28.
261948 KOREAN CONST. art. 13.27
"AII citizens shall enjoy freedom of religion and freedom of conscience." 1948 KOREAN
CONST. art. 12.2 8
"All citizens shall enjoy freedom of science and arts..." Id. art. 14.
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evidence, as we have seen, demonstrates that the Korean people did not
have a heritage of legality at the time that the Constitution was written. 29
And they cid not have social customs which grow from individual rights.30
Nevertheless, regarded from a psycho-historical standpoint, the post-war
period was an age of rationalism, for natural law was revived.31 Therefore,
even if the objective order of Korean society did not come to be the "sum
total of all of the subjective rights of the individual"32 the spirit of the
Constitution of Korea could be said to have followed from the base of
higher law-reason, the greatest stream of natural law. This is apparent
from the effusion of Chin-O Yu, the draftsman of the Constitution, that its
spirit was not the creature of the makers of the Constitution, but relied on
the main lines of philosophic doctrines.33 True, the Constitution embodied
universal precepts underlying all such libertarian instruments.
Since natural law, which is an endless expression of a civilization, played
an important role in the assertion of human rights in the Constitution,3 4 and
the force of reason was to divert the unreflective cause of events into
beneficial channels, natural law approximated positive law, and hence the
sovereignty of the people3 5 and the conception of a consolidated govern-
ment 36 were firmly established. In this sense, the Constitution was not the
source, but. the consequence, of the rights of the individual.
Nevertheless, the individual was not left free to follow his selfish in-
terests in competition with other individuals, without interference from the
government, because man envisaged by the Constitution was not man in
the abstract, but social man. Responding to the significance of the public
interest, the Constitution provided limitations on all human rights, and thus
on freedom of speech.3 7 A loophole, "except as specified by law" was, as
already seen, left in the guarantee of free speech.
29So far as "legality is concerned, the Anglo-Americans are proud of a heritage of legality.
See KIRALFY, PORTER'S OUTLINE OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 4-5 (1958).
3
°Human rights based on democratic and egalitarian values were for the first time
stipulated during the American-Government rule.
3 1See Harding, A Reviving Natural Law, NATURAL LAW & NATURAL RIGHTS 68 (A.
Harding ed. 1955).32Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages xx-xxi (S. Chrimes trans. with Introd.
1939), quoted in F. LESAR, TREASON IN ROMAN AND GERMANIC LAW 225 (1965).
33C. Yu, supra, note 11 at 28.
34T. HAN, supra, note 24 at 160 and 164.
35"The sovereignty of the Republic of Korea shall reside in the people." 1948 CONST. art.
2. This is the same as Article 2 of the present Constitution.
36
"All State authority shall emanate from the people." (Id.); "The Republic of Korea
shall be a democratic and republican State." Id., art. I. This article has not been amended.
37"Laws imposing restrictions upon the liberties and rights of citizens shall be enacted
only when necessary for the maintenance of public order or the welfare of the community."
Id., art. 28, sec. 2.
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B. Amendments to the Constitution and
Freedom of Speech
During the 23-year period of its existence, the Constitution has been
amended six times. For the "establishment of a new Democratic Republic,
on the basis of ideals manifested in the April 19th Righteous Uprising"
against the corrupt election of March 15, 1960, the Constitution was
amended on June 15, 1960.38 Article 13 of the amended Constitution
Article read:
No citizen shall be subjected to any restrictions on the freedom of speech
and press, and the freedom of assembly and association...
The "Ideals manifested in the April 19th Righteous Uprising" were
based on the will of the people. The people were one homogeneous mass
demanding liberty, whence the libertarian feeling of the people began to
permeate the political leaders. As a result, the amended Constitution was
more liberal than that of 1948. Except as noted below restrictions on
freedom of speech and press were not permitted. Nothing could be pro-
vided by law with regard to license or censorship over speech or press, nor
any license for assembly or association. 39
However, the Bill of Rights in the Constitution could not be converted
by any doctrinaire logic into a suicide pact.40 Freedom of speech was to be
limited by Article 28 which read: "All freedom and rights of the people
may be restricted by law only when it is necessary for the maintenance of
order and public welfare" on condition that "such restriction shall not
impair the substance of freedoms and rights." '41
The Constitution was again forced to undergo an ordeal when the Mili-
tary Revolution erupted at dawn on May 16, 1961. By Article 3 of the
"Law Concerning Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction"
proclaimed by the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, the fun-
damental rights of the people provided in the Constitution were guaranteed
to such extent as was not inconsistent with the fulfillment of the Revolu-
tionary Tasks. Such de facto suspension continued until the Constitution
38The Preamble to the 1960 Constitution. The Uprising resulted in the demise of the
Syngmap Rhee r6gime. On April 26, 1960 Rhee was forced to step down from his presidency.
3 9 0n July 4, 1952, the Constitution was amended for the first time to provide for direct
election of the President, and for the creation of an upper house (House of Councilors) in the
legislature. On November 27, 1954, the Constitution was amended again. The most important
amendment provided that any question involving the security of the Republic, or the safety of
its democratic form of government, should be decided by a two-thirds referendum vote of the
people. See, HAN, supra, note 24 at 24- 28.
401960 KOREAN CONST. art. 28.4 1See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1. 37 (1948).
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was almost entirely amended and put into force on December 17, 1963.42
The Constitution, as amended and put into force on that day, is the basic
law of the land. Article 18 provides:
All citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and press, freedom of assembly
and association.
Licensing or censorship in regard to speech and press and permit of
assembly and association shall not be recognized. However, censorship in
regard to motion pictures and dramatic plays may be authorized for the
maintenance of public morality and social ethics.
The publication standard and facilities of a newspaper or press may be
prescribed by law.
Control of the time and place of outdoor assembly may be determined in
accordance with the provisions of law.
Neither the press nor any other publications shall impugn the personal
honor or rights of an individual, nor shall either infringe upon public morality.
It is important to observe that Article 8 provides for the ideological basis
of liberties and freedoms. It stipulates: "All citizens shall have dignity, and
value as human beings, and it shall be the duty of the State to guarantee
fundamental rights of the people to the utmost." The basic norm of the
Constitution is the constellation of human interest. Accordingly, freedom
of speech is derived from the nature of mankind.
On the other hand, since the Constitution seeks a just poise between the
interests of the individual and social interests, freedom of expression is
limited by public "order" or "public welfare." 4
As stated, the Supreme Court of Korea is the final interpreter of the law
of the land and guardian of the Constitution. The very purpose of the Bill
of Rights was to establish liberties and freedoms as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. 4 As a consequence, the essence of legal right
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the Constitution and laws before the courts.
The Supreme Court will draw the concrete line between speech which is
free and that which may constitutionally be suppressed. In other words, the
warp and woof of such undesirable modes and manners of expression as
the "seditious," the "subversive," the "obscene" and the "libelous" will be
spelled out by the Court.
421960 KOREAN CONST., art. 28 (Emphasis added).
43On November 29, 1960, the Constitution had been amended to provide a basis on
which to punish persons who had violated the Constitution and Law Concerning Presidential
Elections in 1960, and those who had fired at the people who took part in the April 19th
Righteous Uprising, because those punishments were covered by an exception to the con-
stitutional provision against ex post facto laws. See, Mun, The Korean Constitution, at
101- 102 (1964). On October 17, 1969, the Constitution was amended again by a referendum
to permit a President to seek three consecutive four-year terms. (Art. 69(3)).
"KOREAN CONST., art. 32.
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III. The Judicial Definition of Freedom of Speech
and the Birth of Judicial Formula
A. Introduction
Before undertaking a discussion of the role of the courts in connection
with freedom of speech, a brief survey of judicial review may be of interest.
Under the original Constitution of 1948, the Constitution Committee was
granted the power of judicial review under a theory of direct review as
distinct from the American type of judicial review. This was a result of the
strong influence of the German Constitutional Court.
The Committee consisted of the Vice President of Korea as Chairman,
five judges of the Supreme Court, three members of House of Represen-
tatives and two members of the House of Councilors. The appointments of
the judges of the Committee, except in the case of judges taken from both
Houses, were for a term of four years. Judges from the Houses served
during their tenure of office in each House. All judges were to lose their
judgeships when they left their principal posts.
The Committee had jurisdiction to pass on the validity of a statute when
a proceeding was brought before it by the court.4 If reliance was placed on
a statute as an element of a concrete case, it was the court's function to
interpret the statute, but not to determine whether it was consistent with
the Constitution. If a question of constitutional validity of the statute arose,
the function of the court was to refer such question to the Constitution
Committee, which was the sole agency charged with the power to review
legislative enactments. 46 Any six of eleven judges constituted a quorum,
and a decision holding a statute unconstitutional required a two thirds
majority vote of the Committee. The function of the Constitution Com-
mittee penetrated only into the area of legal concern, although the Com-
mittee was something more than a regular court.
In 1960 came the demise of the Constitution Committee, substituted for
the Constitutional Court which continued to exist until 1963. The amended
Constitution of 1960 set up the Constitutional Court as the sole agency
charged with the power of judicial review. The Court was made up of nine
judges. Three judges were to be appointed by the President, three by the
Supreme Court and three by the House of Councilors. The terms of the
judges were six years, the appointments being staggered so that three new
judges were appointed every two years.
4See West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 391 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
4"When the judgment in any case is dependent on the constitutionality of a law, the court
shall refer such question to the Constitution Committee, and shall render judgment in accor-
dance with the decision thereof." 1948 CoNsT., art. 81, sec. 2.
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The Court had jurisdiction to pass on the constitutional validity of
legislative enactments via one of three proceedings. First, the Con-
stitutional Court had jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of a statute
whenever any court referred the question to it in case the court deemed the
statute repugnant to the Constitution. Second, it had jurisdiction to pass on
the validity of a statute when a proceeding was instituted by public author
ity for the sole purpose of deciding whether the statute was constitutional.
Lastly, it had original jurisdiction in a "constitutional complaint" brought
by a person who could not agree upon his constitutional rights under a
statute.
In the last two, there was no true adversary proceeding to determine the
rights of antagonistic parties. Besides these jurisdictions, the Constitutional
Court had some jurisdiction over matters of "vital political concern. 4 7
Manifestly, the function of the Constitutional Court was to maintain the
integrity of the constitutional order, and thus it felt a special responsibility
as the chief guardian of constitutionality. As in the case of the Constitution
Committee, any six of nine judges constituted a quorum, and a decision on
the constitutionality of a statute required concurrence of not less than six
judges of the Court. The judges of the Court were not permitted to join any
political party nor to participate in politics, even though some of them were
to be elected by political organs. This concept was based on the principle
of neutrality. In 1963, with the demise of the German style of judicial
review, 48 the American style was adopted. With this, the Korean rule of
law shifted from the traditional "Rechtsstaat" to government under law.
Under the present system of judicial review, in the essence of things,
either of two judicial techniques, one called "judicial modesty" or "judicial
self-restraint," the other "judicial activism," 49 can be introduced into the
Supreme Court of Korea. The power of judicial review is expressly granted
471f a party in a concrete case petitions the court to refer the question of the con-
stitutionality of a statute relied on as an element of the case, or if the presiding judge does so,
a three-judge court decides whether the statute be referred. Thus, the court primarily decides
whether the statute squares with the Constitution. If the statute is held to be unconstitutional,
the statute is referred to the Committee, but if the statute is held to be constitutional, then the
statute is not referred to the Committee.48 Besides the power of judicial review, the Constitutional Court had jurisdiction over the
following: Disputes on authorities arising between the State organs or agencies; disbandment
of a political party; trials on impeachment; Litigation related to the election of the President,
Chief Justice and Justices. 1960 CONST., art. 83 (3).49The Constitutional Court of Korea differed from that of West Germany in that the
Korean Constitutional Court had jurisdiction to pass on the validity only of laws (legislative
enactments), while the West German Constitutional Court had competence to pass on the
validity of both laws and actions of some governmental agencies.
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to the courts,50 and therefore the judges can make policy decisions, al-
though the form of judicial review is the same as the power to decide a
concrete case. On the other hand, since freedom of speech is qualified on
its face, some judges may regard "judicial activism" as judicial interference
with legislative decision, and hence they may take the position of "judicial
modesty."
b. Concord and Discord
The jaws of power during the reign of Syngman Rhee repressed freedom
of speech and of the press inimical to the regime. The Kyonghyang Shin-
mun Case,51 which was in part assailed as a violation of freedom of speech
and press under the Constitution of 1948, illustrates a phase of such
situations.
On April 30, 1959, the Ministry of Public Information of Korea with-
drew a publication license from The Kyonghyang Shinmun, one of the
leading newspapers published in Seoul, in pursuance of its plenary power
to license as granted by Military Government Ordinance 88 proclaimed
during the American Military regime. The Ministry published a set of facts
as grounds for the withdrawal: (1) On January 11, 1959, The Kyonghyang
Shinmun, in its editorial entitled "the incoherent phase between the gov-
ernment and the government party," reported false facts, and thus brought
about political chaos; (2) On February 4 of the same year, in its article on a
majoritarian tyranny, it incited the people to revolt against Rhee's reign,
denying the elective system prescribed by the Constitution, etc.
The Kyonghyang Shinmun brought an action before the Seoul Higher
5 0
"Judicial modesty" is equivalent to positive responsibilities, while "judicial activism" is
directed to advance policy conceptions and protect values which are explicitly or impliedly
enshrined in the constitutional order. From the standpoint of judicial modesty or judicial
self-restraint, the court is not to interpret a constitution according to the judges conception of
current political and social philosophies. Therefore, a strict and literal interpretation domi-
nates judicial review. Fundamental rights are not interpreted beyond their express terms. The
legacy of Justices Holmes and Brandeis of the Supreme Court of the United States is one of
judicial modesty, so far as economic rights and theories are concerned. Their judicial posture
shifts to judicial activism, as to civil liberties. In contrast to judicial modesty, "judicial
activism" is governed less by canons of construction than by philosophic moods. It interprets
the text of a constitution according to the intellectual and moral climate of the age. The main
thrust of judicial activism is directed to protection of the values and objectives of a free and
open society. The activists' concern for certain basic ideals, such as free speech and press and
freedom of religion, evidences a resolution to employ the judicial power in a bold and
aggressive way, to mould the constitutional order in accordance with the evolving ethos of a
democratic society. Thus, the judicial activitists are alert to making political decisions. See
Kauper, The Supreme Court: Hybrid Organ of State ANNUAL REPORT G. STOREY LECTURE
(1967); Freund, The Supreme Court in Contemporary Life, 19 S.W. L.J. 439 (1965).5 1
"The Supreme Court shall have the power to decide with finality the constitutionality of
a law, when a determination of its constitutionality is pre-requisite to, a trial." KOREAN
CONST., art. 102 (1).
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Court to revoke the administrative act of the Ministry of Public In-
formation. At the same time, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction in
order to avoid the excessive damages to be incurred from the adminis-
trative act.52 On June 26, 1959, the Seoul Higher Court issued the prelim-
inary injunction sought by the plaintiff against the Ministry, to refrain from
continuing its act of suppression. 53
At the moment that the preliminary injunction was issued, the employ-
ees of the newspaper returned to their work for publication of the evening
edition of the same day. But the Ministry of Public Information, revoking
its original act, shifted its hard blow to the daily newspaper to an indefinite
suspension of its publication pursuant to the provisions of Military Gov-
ernment Ordinance 88. In this instance, the Ministry appended a few
words to the acts which it had charged that the daily newspaper had
committed: "These acts constitute a violation of law, for they are to
subvert the national constitution and destroy public order. . .54
The publisher again brought an administrative suit before the same court
to revoke the later administrative act.5 5 The plaintiff contended in its brief,
that Military Government Ordinance 88 was unconstitutional, for it pro-
vided for licensing the press, withdrawing a publication license and sus-
pending publication in violation of the constitutional provisions of freedom
of speech and of the press, and accordingly petitioned to refer its con-
tention to the Constitution Committee.56 Rejecting such contention, the
Seoul Higher Court dismissed the suit.
The Court stated that freedom of speech and of the press took the form
of an ordered liberty, with such limitations as "except specified by law" 57
and "restrictions ... only when necessary for the maintenance of public
order or the welfare of the community," 58 as stipulated by the Constitution.
The Court continued to state that, in the light of such loopholes, licensing
was not incompatible with the intent and meaning of the constitutional
provision of freedom of speech and of the press. 59 By analogy to licensing,
the Court held that revoking a license or suspending publication did not
52No case book or report as to the Constitution has as yet been published in Korea.
5rhe ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL LAW art. 10.54Cited in Urn, Freedom of Expression and Administrative Discretion, I SEOUL L.J. 464
(No. 2, 1959).
551d., at 465.56Cited in Urn, Id.; K. Lee,Jurisdiction of the Court on the Constitutionality of Military
Government Ordinances, I SEOUL L.J. 441-442 (No. 2, 1959).
57See supra, note 46.58
"Citizens shall not, except as specified by law, be subjected to any restrictions on the
freedom of speech, press, assembly and association," 1948 CONST., art. 13.59ld., art. 28, sec. 2.
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depreciate freedom of speech and of the press. 60 Thus, the Court brought
itself to conclude that Military Government Ordinance 88 was still in
effect6 l by virtue of Article 100 of the Constitution which affirmed the
effect of existing laws and administrative ordinances prior to the adoption
of the Constitution when deemed constitutional.6 2
Turning to plaintiff's petition to refer the question of the constitutionality
of the Ordinance to the Constitution Committee, the Court ruled that,
since the Ordinance was an administrative order and not a law, under
Article 81 of the Constitution considered as an element of the jurisdiction
of the Constitution Committee,63 the Ordinance did not come under the
control of that Committee.64 Consequently, in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article 81, sec. 1 of the Constitution, granting the courts the
power of reviewing administrative orders,65 the matter was decided to be
solely within the competent jurisdiction of the Seoul Higher Court 6
Manifestly, the Seoul Higher Court did nothing to give heed to the
deterrent effect of the statutory provision on freedom of speech and of the
press. The Court's holding simply characterized the whole issue as an
exercise of power. Further, it may be pointed out that the Court con-
tradicted itself, for, notwithstanding its characterization of Military Gov-
ernment Ordinance 88 as an administrative order, it connived at the fact
that freedom of speech and of the press were simply curtailed by an
administrative order-Ordinance 88- in contravention of the constitutional
mandate reading: "Laws imposing restrictions upon the liberties and rights
of the citizens shall be enacted only when necessary for the maintenance of
public order or the welfare of the community." 67 Admittedly, "laws" mean
"legislative enactments."
The case was taken to the Supreme Court. Despite the earnest appeal of
the publisher, the Court did nothing to decide the case until after demise of
the r6gime of Syngman Rhee.68 The Court's self-abnegation allowed the
speech right to be eroded to the point at which its restoration became
impossible.
6 Um, supra, note 52 at 468.
6 11d.62 1d.
6 3
"Existing laws and administrative orders shall be in effect to the extent that they do not
conflict with the Constitution." 1948 CoNsT., art. 100.
"See supra, note 45.
6K. Lee, supra note 54, at 442-443.
66"The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction finally to decide whether administrative
orders, regulations and administrative acts are consistent with the Constitution and law."
1948 CO ST., art. 81 sec. 1.67 K. Lee, supra, note 54 at 443.
681948 CONST., art. 28, sec. 2 (Emphasis added).
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The function of courts to refer questions of the constitutionality of
legislative enactments to the Constitution Committee implied the power of
judicial review, for only when they held a statute to be unconstitutional, did
they refer the matter to the Committee.69 Thus, according to law, the
courts could concern themselves, as a practical matter, with deciding
whether a statute squared with the Constitution. Rendition of such deci-
sions was treading on unfamiliar ground for the judges of Korea. They did
not have such a legal heritage. The line of the growth of individual liberties
and right could not be gathered from their experience. Hence, their
self-abnegation allowed freedom of speech to be eroded, and also drew the
speech right into the vicissitudes of political controversy.
Consequently, the courts seem to have been governed only by personal
idiosyncracy, not by fusion of a sense of history, of a logical faculty, or of
the practical ends to be achieved. We may assume that the civil-law judges
are governed only by canons of construction, not by philosophic moods. A
strict and literal interpretation dominates their judicial technique in the field
of constitutional law. Here, the judges may adhere closely to a concept of
legal positivism-"in accordance with law." Their judicial posture tends to
characterize the main issue of a case before them as an exercise of power,
even when they are granted the power of judicial review.
C. The Concept of a Basic Freedom in Democracy and
A Judicial Formula
1. Introduction
In the case of Kyonghyang Shinmun, no concrete judicial formula
evolved. In that case, the judges did not seek to shape a usable test to
secure freedom of speech and of the press. And so far judicial formula like,
for example, the clear-and-present danger test espoused by the Supreme
Court of the United States, 70 has never been worked out. The Constitution
contains in itself the phrases for making tentative decisions necessary to
secure, and at the same time to limit, individual rights. The Constitution
provides: "Liberties and rights of the citizens may be restricted only in
cases deemed necessary for the maintenance of order and public wel-
fare."171 No distinction is made in this provision between restrictions on
economic rights and those on civil liberties, but consideration of values in
69 By judgment in its favor, the Kyonghyang Shinmun resumed its publication.
7 0See supra note 46.71 Most constitutional law professors in Korea take the position that the
clear-and-present-danger test expounded by the Supreme Court of the United States should
be applied to the interpretation of the constitutional provision of freedom of speech or of the
press in Korea. But it has not been adopted by the courts.
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the realm of civil liberties leads to the conclusion that the courts have a
constitutional mandate to apply a "double standard" between economic
rights and civil liberties, and hence freedom of speech. Without a double
standard, freedom of speech can be curtailed on slender grounds, for
"order" and "public welfare" are too broad to define, and it is therefore
necessary to create a precarious "double standard."
2. Preferred-Position
Free men talk about their government, not in terms of its favor but in
terms of their rights. Indeed, freedom of public discussion is the rock on
which a democratic government stands. 72 Freedom to think as we will, and
freedom to speak as we think, are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth. In other words, free speech about public
questions is as important as is the heart to the human body. 73 As a
consequence, the test of legislation which collides with freedom of speech
must be much more definite than the test when economic rights are in-
volved.
A good case can be made for the viability of the preferred position of
freedom of speech from the language of individual rights and liberties. The
economic proprietarian safeguards are couched in the most general terms:
The rights of property shall be guaranteed. Its contents and restrictions of
property shall be determined by law.
The exercise of property rights shall conform to the public welfare...74
The right of private property implies the social reservation in itself, and a
fundamental social doctrine by which the use of property is subject to the
needs of the community is connoted. Hence, the right of private property is
subjected to public regulation when the public needs require.75 Further, its
exercise, whether affected with a public interest or not, is morally bound to
conform to the public welfare.
On the other hand, the terminology governing freedom of speech and of
the press is precise, as stated.7 6 Even if freedom of speech implies a social
interest, the language in which the guaranty is phrased is much more
explicit than that of the right of private property.
The Constitution provides for the "right to live" which is closely related
to the right of private property. Article 30 of the Constitution provides:
72KOREAN CONST., art. 32, sec. 2.
7 3See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 91 (1948).74Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 301-302 (1941)
per Justice Black, dissenting.
75KOREAN CONST., art. 20.76For its American vision see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934).
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"All citizens shall be entitled to a decent human life." Thus, the State is
under a political obligation to enact laws, so far as possible, to enable
people to enjoy a decent standard of living. Although, being not mandato-
ry,77 it may not be enforceable judicially, its vitality is encouraged by
various social fictions or the tautologies for social justice in constitutional
provisions. 78 With this, the State is bound to let each individual have the
portion of property necessary for a decent life. For this purpose, the
content of property is determined by law for the economic life of all people.
As a result, it may be said that property is dehumanized to some extent, in
that property is socially limited by the constitutional contexts. Of course,
the ideal of a decent human life is not confined to the economic sphere. It
is also extended to the cultural sphere.
As a philosophical grounding of speech, the Constitution, as stated,
secures "dignity and value for human beings."' 79 The dignity and value of
the individual, as the important substantive values, must give coherence to
the interpretation of the Constitution. They are the nucleus of individual
rights and liberties which are accredited with super-positive validity.80 As a
consequence, a logical consideration of freedom of speech in connection
with such dignity and value reveals that freedom of speech in and of itself
connotes freedom to think as the individual wills, and freedom to speak as
he thinks. The crest of the wave of the individual interest is always moving.
Here, freedom of speech is essential to the security of the demands and
feelings of the individual. And freedom of speech is the matrix for the
flourishing of other freedoms.
In addition, restrictions on freedom of speech tend to clog the very
political processes normally relied on for peaceful change, and freedom of
speech offers a democratic alternative to the judicial veto of legislation.8'
As a matter of fact, the Seoul Higher Court in the case of Kyonghyang
"
7 KOREAN CONST., art. 18.
781n the answer to the first of the questions of judicial enforcement, attention should be
paid to judicial determinations as to what constitutional provisions are mandatory and what
directory. The term "mandatory" is used to include only those provisions of a constitution
which are enforceable against a department of government by some means outside of the
department itself. On the other hand, The term "directory" is used to include those not so
enforceable. For further discussion see Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforcable Provisions of Con-
stitutions, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 54 (1931).
"Besides the constitutional provision as to the right of private property, the Constitution
provides for restrictions on farm land: "Agricultural tenancy shall be prohibited in accordance
with the provisions of law;" (KOREAN CONST., art. 113). "The state may impose restrictions
or obligations necessary for the efficient utilization of the farm and forest land in accordance
with the provisions of law." Id., art. 114.
801d., art. 8.
81See Abe, A Problem Concerning the Interpretation of a Constitution, 76 HOGAKU-
RONSO (KYOTO L. REV. in Japan) 194 (Nos. I & 2, 1964).
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Shinmun did not hesitate to define freedom of speech and of the press as
basic freedoms in a democratic society, despite the fact that it allowed the
right to be eroded. Also, the Constitution provides for the "initiative and
referendum" with regard to amendments . 2 The initiative and referendum
presuppose freedom of speech and of the press. Indeed, freedom of speech
is the "multilation of the thinking process of the community," ' 3 and basic
to the process of political flux.
Here we can conclude that the Supreme Court has a constitutional
mandate to apply the preferred-position test.8 4 This is the minimum re-
quirement reasonably implied in the Constitution.
IV. A Witch Hunt of Subversive Activities
A. Ideological Reaction to Communism
Regarded from a geo-political view, anti-subversive laws are aimed at
protection of the country from Communist subversive activities or the like.
The most stringent of Communist control laws came into being in 1961
with the enactment of the Anti-Communist Law which was designed to
outlaw individual Communist activities. In the previous year, just after the
downfall of Syngman Rhee, the legislature had enacted the National Secur-
ity Law85 which was directed at outlawing a subversive activity or activi-
ties of a subversive group.
Aside from such legislative controls of subversive activities, looking
toward the preservation of the "basic democratic order," the Constitution
itself renders the existence of a Communist party illegal, regardless of its
aims. The Constitution provides:
The establishment of political parties shall be free and the plural party
system shall be guaranteed.
Organization and activities of a political party shall be democratic, and
political parties shall have all such necessary organizational arrangements as
will enable the people to participate in the formation of political ideas.
Political parties shall enjoy the protection of the State. However, if the
purposes or activities of a political party are contrary to the basic democratic
82See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938), per Justice
Stone.
03"A motion to amend the constitution shall be introduced ... by the concurrence of five
hundred thousand or more of the voters eligible to vote for the members of the National
Assembly." KOREAN CONST., art. 119 (I). "After an amendment to the Constitution has been
adopted, it shall be submitted to a national referendum within sixty days, and shall receive the
affirmative votes of more than one half of votes cast by more than one half of all voters
eligible to vote for the election of the members of the National Assembly." Id., art. 121.
84See Meiklejohn, supra, note 71 at 26-27.
85The presumption of unconstitutionality of a law restricting freedom of speech may exist,
and the burden of proof is cast on the person upholding the constitutionality of the law. See
supra, note 80.
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order, the Government shall bring an action against it in the Supreme Court
for its dissolution, and the political party shall be dissolved in accordance
with the decision of the Supreme Court.86
In libertarian democracy, general political parties are effective agents of
the democratic process only when they present unfettered ideas.8 7 In
keeping with that tenor, the Korean Constitution contrives a special mea-
sure for protecting political parties from the jaws of government power.88
However, the Constitution makes efforts to restrict human rights in such a
way as to make them unavailable to the enemies of the basic democratic
order. The basic democratic order means the basic libertarian-democratic
order of the Constitution, which enshrines the sovereignty of the people
and individual liberties and rights.89 The demolition of the basic democratic
order results from bringing about destruction of the identity of the Con-
stitution which may expose the security of the nation to danger. The basic
democratic order is aimed at preventing the emergence of totalitarian
methods which might in turn result from constitutional stress on social
goals and their implementation through socialization9" and the rising of
Communism. But the Constitution seems to insist on an ideological reac-
tion to Communism rather than to totalitarian methods. As a consequence,
the Constitution attempts to devise a witch-hunt against Communism.
When the purposes of a political party are in contravention of the basic
democratic order, the government may bring an action before the Supreme
Court for the dissolution of the political party. 9 1 The purposes of a political
party are not only embodied in the Constitution of the political party, but
are also deduced from contexts of the party's organ, or the activities of its
components. 92 When the activities of its components are contrary to the
basic democratic order, the nexus between the party and its components
can stand, and here party subversive activity may be allowed to stand. 93 In
"The first National Security Law had been enacted in 1958, but the Law was entirely
revised in its structures in 1960.87 KOREAN CONST., art. 7.
88Cohen and Fuchs,Communist Challenges and the Constitution, 34 CORNELL L. Q. 352
(1949).
89KOREAN CoNsT., art. 7. 88 Mun, supra, note 42 at 341.
90See Friedlich, Political Theory of New Democratic Constitution, in Constitutions and
Constitutional Trends Since World War II (Aurcher ed. 1951) 18.
91 KOREAN CONST., art. 7.
92Mun, supra, note 42 at 342.9 3The government can use all available legal sanctions provided by anti-subversive laws
against political offenders. And if the political offenders belong to a political party, party
subversive activity will be allowed to stand, and the political party may be dissolved by the
decision of the Supreme Court in accordance with Article 7 of the Constitution. In this case,
the political party will be considered to be a subversive organization.
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this connection, the Constitution takes preventive measures against the
rising of anti-democratic parties.94
B. Forensic Approach
Truly, the enormity of the difficulty of any attempt to establish a judicial
formula in the area of freedom of speech is apparent. The courts' approach
is simply to interpret anti-subversive laws in accordance with the general
rule of criminality. Thus, at the present, the protection of freedom of
speech comes about from a strict interpretation of anti-subversive laws and
through ensuring procedural safeguards. By so doing, the courts can cast
their weight on the side of modernizing anti-subversive laws.
According to anti-subversive laws, anyone who instigates or propagates
with intention, under instructions from an anti-state group, or as a member
thereof, to organize a subversive group or association for the purpose of
having it teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force and
violence, is subject to punishment.95 And anyone who praises or encour-
ages the activities of an anti-state organization or its components or world
Communist movements is also punishable.9 6 Words and intention are pun-
ishable for their own sake in accordance with the rule of criminality.9 7
Moreover, the membership clause of the Anti-Communist Law makes
punishable active, knowing membership in any organization which praises
the activities of an anti-state organization or its components or world
Communist movements. 98
As the history of judicial policies indicates, "it is procedure that spells
much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice."99
Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards may be the main assur-
ance that there is equal justice under law.100 And strict interpretation of
such anti-subversive laws is very important. Nevertheless, this is not
enough: "Statutory interpretation may cloak a policy of stubborn judicial
negativism." 101 Statutory interpretation at best means that every interest
with regard to which the legislature is competent to make laws, is to prevail
over the interests of free speech, and thus freedom of speech may lose its
94Mun,supra, note 42 at 342.
95NATIONAL SECURITY LAW art. 4.
"
6ANTI-COMMUNIST LAW art. 4 (1).
9 7Acts done intentionally are punishable. KOREAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 13.
9 8ANTI-COMMUNIST LAW art. 4.
9 9Joint Anti-Fascist Refugees Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951), per
Justice Douglas, concurring.
1001d.
X'lMcKloskey, The Supreme Court Finds a Role: Civil Liberties in the 1955 Term, 42
VA. L. REV. 735, 756-757 (1956).
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virility. Here substantive bars in the subversive field are required to be
erected in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Individual liberties and rights may be restricted only in cases deemed
necessary for the maintenance of order and public welfare. 102 In this
context, the meanings of the maintenance of order and public welfare are
closely linked to protecting individual liberties and rights. Many 103 have
subscribed to the meaning of the "maintenance of order." It comprises the
constitutional order and the social order. Since the Constitution does not
envisage the individual being left free to follow his selfish interests in
competition with other individuals, without interference from the govern-
ment, individual liberties and rights may be limited when the exercise of
individual liberties and rights runs afoul of the constitutional order and/or
the social order. Subversive activities are in contravention of the con-
stitutional order, and hence they may constitutionally be repressed. But
since the Constitution is not the source but the consequence of individual
rights, the scales must be tipped to the interests of the individual.
Let us turn to examine the maintenance of public welfare. "Public
welfare" is really incapable of definition. Indeed, "since Bentham's greatest
happiness of the greatest number and Karl Marx's universal satisfaction of
needs in accordance with universal wants, both obsolete in their vagueness
and the latter also in its sole means of realization, there has been no
attempt to transpose the concept of public welfare into the contemporary
context."' 1 4 The essence of public welfare is the individual responsibility
to one's community. But the stable core of public welfare is still regarded
as being aimed at the individual interest, for the Constitution does not seek
the glory of the state or of society. The Constitution of Korea provides: "It
shall be the duty of the State to guarantee the fundamental rights of the
people to the utmost."' 05 Furthermore, the Constitution emphasizes this
concept: "In case of ... restriction, the essential substances of liberties
and rights shall not be infringed."'' 0 Again, in connection with the mainte-
nance of public welfare, the scales must be tipped toward the individual
interest in freedom of speech.
The courts are called upon to decide whether the state has a "compelling
102KOREAN CONST., art. 32, sec. 2.
'
03Kim, Guaranty and Limitation of Fundamental Rights, 7 SEOUL L.J. 60-61 (No. 1,
1965).
104Volar, The Concept of Public Welfare-An Historical-Comparative Essay, 8 AM. J.
COMp. L.44 1959).
105Art. 8.
1°6Art. 32, sec. 2.
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interest" deemed necessary for the maintenance of order and public wel-
fare in limiting freedom of speech. In other words, interests in freedom of
speech are to be weighed against "competing interests" in national secur-
ity.1°7 If an overriding and compelling state interest is not found in limiting
freedom of speech, the plain constitutional mandate of freedom of speech
would be paralyzed 0 8
Be that it may, "order" and "public welfare" may give a great amplitude
of discretion to the judiciary. Thus, the issue of reasonableness can be
made a justiciable one. It is for the Supreme Court, in its discretion, to
apply the standard of reasonableness and of the restraint thereunder.
Conclusion
In Korea, as was pointed out in the Introduction, the Supreme Court
was granted the power of judicial review in 1963. Thus, a seed has been
sown. Even in a country which does not have a legal tradition, it is the
court which can best protect the rights of minorities which tend, in turn, to
become submerged in the political processes of government. As a matter of
fact, the other branches of government, precisely because they are politi-
cal, may and do find it difficult at times to withstand the pressure of
majority opinion.109 "Judicial oligarchy" is different from the tyranny of the
majority.
If the Supreme Court of Korea continues merely to apply broad
tests -the order test and public-welfare test, freedom of speech may lose
its vitality, and is subject to the power of the legislature to make con-
'
0 Theoretically speaking, the balancing-of-interests test puts the whole interest in nation-
al security on one side of the scale, and the particular interest of the particular individual on
the other; and hence it is difficult to see how the impartiality of such judgments can be
assured, unless the courts abandon ad hocbalancing. For further discussion, see Frantz, The
First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1966).
108 1n the United States, Justice Frankfurter attempted to turn the Supreme Court toward
his initial balancing manifesto instead of the clear and present danger test and the pre-
ferred-position test. The Justice did so not only in political-speech cases but also in associ-
ation cases. The balancing-of-interests test has never been adopted by the majority of the
Supreme Court of the United States in speech cases, but the Court has applied the test to
freedom-of-association cases. Since "association" presupposes "organization," freedom of
association connotes the concept of some sort of physical act. Therefore, the advocacy of
violence may be more dangerous when it comes out from members of an efficient, purposeful,
and semi-clandestine organization than when it is spoken by an isolated soap-box orator. See
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Gibson v. Florida, 83 S. Ct. 889 (1963);
N.A.A.C.P. v. Butten, 83 S. Ct. 328 (1963); Konisberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36
(1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).109Miller and Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI.
L. REV. 661, 694 (1960).
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travening laws. This is particularly true with speech in political matters
when such factors as pressures, passions and fears about Communism
arising from the international political climates exist. If "the calmer times"
of which Justice Black of the Supreme Court of the United States spoke in
the Dennis dissent n1 prevail, freedom of speech must be given a preferred
place as against national security.
"
0
°Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951).
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